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Abstract
Enforcing integrity and confidentiality of users’ applica-
tion code and data is a challenging mission that any soft-
ware developer working on an online production grade ser-
vice is facing. Since cryptology is not a widely understood
subject, people on the cutting edge of research and indus-
try are always seeking for new technologies to naturally
expand the security of their programs and systems. Intel
Software Guard Extension (Intel SGX) is an Intel technol-
ogy for developers who are looking to protect their soft-
ware binaries from plausible attacks using hardware in-
structions. The Intel SGX puts sensitive code and data
into CPU-hardened protected regions called enclaves. In
this project we leverage the Intel SGX to produce a secure
cryptographic library which keeps the generated keys in-
side an enclave restricting use and dissemination of confi-
dential cryptographic keys. Using enclaves to store the keys
we maintain a small Trusted Computing Base (TCB) where
we also perform computation on temporary buffers to and
from untrusted application code. As a proof of concept, we
implemented hashes and symmetric encryption algorithms
inside the enclave where we stored hashes, Initialization
Vectors (IVs) and random keys and open sourced the code
(https://github.com/hmofrad/CryptoEnclave).
Keywords: Intel Software guard extension, enclave,
cryptography, small trusted computing base.
1. Introduction
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) provides an iso-
lated and trusted environment embedded in the device dur-
ing manufacture. This enables the device’s processor and
memory to protect user installed applications through hard-
ware isolation. A trusted computing base is the minimum
amount of code, usually consisting of hardware, firmware,
and other software components, that a user must trust. If
there is a bug or vulnerability in the trusted computing base,
the entire system will contain a security breach.
Mass processor manufacturers like Intel have built em-
bedded hardware technologies to support TEE implemen-
tations. The Intel SGX [1, 2, 3] is a set of new hard-
ware instructions that enables applications to run code and
safeguard important data such as cryptographic keys from
within their own protected execution environment. As a re-
sult, the CPU becomes the only exposed surface area to re-
main vulnerable. The Intel SGX is shipped with a Software
Development Kit (SDK), which is a collection of develop-
ment resources in C/C++ to deliver a production quality ap-
plication. It supports sealing of data and local attestation
between enclaves as well as remote attestation by a remote
server to verify enclave identity. The SGX cryptographi-
cally hashes the code and data in an enclave which is a pro-
tected region of memory and only allows the code within
the enclave access its data.
The SGX architecture enables developers to create hard-
ware assisted enclaves. These enclaves are opaque con-
tainers to the host Operating System (OS). In this project
we aim to create a cryptographic library that performs the
cryptographic operations inside an enclave, allowing de-
velopers to abstract away their application’s dependencies
on cryptographic functions and fearlessly store their keys
inside the enclave. The enclave encrypts and stores the
application’s sensitive keys such that the application can
store its encrypted data outside of the enclave, without fear
of another, potentially malicious, application from reading
or tampering that data. As with any professionally writ-
ten cryptographic library, by abstracting away the crypto-
graphic functions, developers can create applications which
are less prone to vulnerabilities because of poorly executed
cryptography. More importantly, the SGX enclave provides
a safe place to store cryptographic keys. In order for an ap-
plication to encrypt and decrypt its data, it needs to store or
have a process to regenerate the same cryptographic keys.
If an application’s symmetric key or private key is stored in
an untrusted location, the encrypted data is vulnerable. An
attacker with access to both the data and the cryptographic
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keys can read and manipulate the data. Similarly, if an ap-
plication depends on a process to regenerate a key, an at-
tacker can easily discover this process and create the same
key. An SGX enclave seals off the keys such that an attacker
will not be able to access it. Since the key will never leave
the enclave, an application’s data will not be prone to data
tampering or manipulation type of attack. Even if an at-
tacker places malicious code into the operating system, the
keys will remain protected inside of the enclave because the
operating system cannot read an enclave’s data.
Intel SGX instructions build and execute the enclave into
a special protected memory region with a restricted en-
try/exit location, which is defined by the developer. Thus,
this prevents data leakage. Since keys can never leave the
enclave, applications can only encrypt and decrypt its own
data with the enclave. It cannot send encrypted data to an-
other application, either on the same machine or a separate
one, because that data would be unreadable.
We implemented our project using the
intel-sgx-sdk [4] from Intel open source. Also,
we borrowed code from LibTomCrypt [5] to implement
cryptographic algorithms. The current implementation of
the project supports the following cryptographic functions:
1. Secure Hash with 256 bits digest (SHA-256).
2. Keyed-hash Message Authentication Code with SHA-
256 cryptographic hash function (HMAC-SHA-256).
3. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Electronic
Codebook (ECB) mode which supports three different
key lengths including 128, 292, and 256 bits (AEC-
ECB).
4. AES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode which
supports three different key lengths including 128,
192, and 256 bits (AEC-CBC).
However, in our future work, we will create a protocol
for two enclaves, either on the same machine or separate,
to mutually authenticate each other and to create a shared
secret key in order to transmit data over an unsafe channel.
Unsafe channel is defined to be the mechanism of transmit-
ting data from one enclave to another that is vulnerable to
both passive and active attackers. Since malware can re-
side in an OS, even two enclaves on the same machine must
assume to have an unsafe channel between them.
The remainder of this report is divided into the follow-
ing sections. In Section 2, we introduce the SDK and li-
braries we have used to implement our secure cryptographic
library. In Section 3, we provide a technical overview of the
implemented nondisclosure cryptographic library. In Sec-
tion 4, we present the ideas and benefits for future work on
this project. In Section 5, we summarize our findings and
show our achievements from this research project. Finally,
in Section 6 we discuss some related work.
2. Tools
2.1. Intel SGX SDK
The SGX programming model [6] states that an enclave
is an isolated region within the application’s address space
that only code resided within the enclave can access its code
and data. Using SGX, an application is armed with a set of
instructions that secures its life cycle as a software. After
installing an application, first the application launches an
enclave. Next, the enclave contacts the service provider to
identify the hardware. Then, upon successful verification
the service provider establishes a secure channel to enclave.
After that, the enclave starts using the hardware-based en-
cryption to peform cryptographic operations on its data. Fi-
nally, in the case of software upgrade, the software can re-
quest seal keys to unseal the older versions of the data.
Intel SGX [6] ships with 17 new instructions for supervi-
sor and user mode that can be categorized into followings:
1. Enclave build/teardown to allocate/deallocate pro-
tected memory for the enclave (ECREATE, EADD,
EEXTEND, EINIT, and EREMOVE operations).
2. Enclave entry/exit to enter/exit an enclave (EENTER,
ERESUME, EEXIT, and AEX operations).
3. Paging instructions to secure page movement and
replacement (EPA, ELDB/U, EWB, EBLOCK, and
ETRACK operations).
4. Debug instructions to debug enclaves (EDBGRD, and
EDBGWR operations).
5. Enclave security operations to let the enclave prove its
identity to an external party (EREPORT, EGETKEY
operations).
2.2. Cryptographic Library
Because there are a plethora of cryptographic libraries
already implemented in C or C++, we did not need to write
our own implementation of cryptographic functions. In-
stead, we first narrowed down our search to reputable, well
written, libraries. The first requirement for the library was
that it had to be modular. We needed a library that we could
break apart and only take a few of the functions that we
needed. Our next, and more important, requirement was
that the library is secure. Secure, as defined in this context,
means the library cannot be vulnerable to timing attacks,
back doors, or weak key generation. A cryptographic algo-
rithm with a large key size is still weak if the implementa-
tion is vulnerable to side channel attacks. Our search led
us to three candidates that all support symmetric key algo-
rithms, hash functions, pseudo random number generators,
and public key algorithms. Three cryptographic libraries
that we looked into are:
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1. The first candidate was LibTomCrypt [5] library which
is open sourced and built to be highly modular, two
necessities for our project. While the library does not
support SSL or verification of certificates, it contains
all the necessary tools to do so. The API was built
to be able to support any new cipher, hash, or pseudo
random number generator. Thus, as new algorithms
are created and old algorithms are broken, very few
lines of code will have to be changed to add new, up to
date algorithms.
2. The second candidate was OpenSSL [7], written in the
C programming language, is very powerful and pro-
vides support for Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocols [8]. Started in
1998, OpenSSL has been rigorously tested and patched
over the years. Since the second phase of our project
includes two SGX enclaves sharing keys, the TLS
and SSL protocols in OpenSSL would be valuable re-
sources. However, OpenSSL contains much more than
this project requires and a more modular library op-
tion will likely be chosen. It is worth note that the
Github repository of Openssl [9] has 3,264 stars and
1,866 forks.
3. The third candidate was Crypto++ [10], written in
the C++ programming language. Crypto++ has doc-
umentation for each algorithm in its library and its
own Wiki page [11]. If the project required an en-
tire cryptographic library, Crypto++ would probably
be the top choice, since there is an easy installation
process. However, the source code for Crypto++ is
poorly organized on Github [12]. Since it was written
to be shipped all together, there are no sub-directories
in the libraries file system structure. This will make it
more difficult to take only the algorithms needed for
this project.
Because of the complexity of OpenSSL [7] and limi-
tations of the [10] which are stated the above, we chose
LibTomCrypt [13] which is a part of an open source project
[5]. Written in C, LibTomCrypt is well organized and main-
tained project with 405 stars and 144 forks on its Github
repository [14]. On its website, LibTomCrypt proclaims to
be written to be both modular and portable. While LibTom-
Crypt is not as widely used as OpenSSL, it has still be im-
plemented in both academic and professional settings. Fur-
thermore, LibTomCrypt is compatible with GCC and Visual
C++, which is also compatible with SGX SDK.
3. Nondisclosure Cryptographic Library
In this project, we select some parts of LibTomCrypt [5]
cryptographic library and make them compatible with the
linux-sgx-sdk [4] from Intel Open Source group (01
dot org). The linux-sgx-sdk is the SGX’s Linux SDK
written in C and C++, which can be run in both emulation
and hardware modes. The project is hosted in Github at
https://github.com/01org/linux-sgx. We installed the SDK
on an Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 64-bit virtual machine with 2 Vir-
tual CPU, 2GB RAM, and 8GB disk and test our implemen-
tation in the simulation mode.
We created wrappers on the existing cryptographic im-
plementations of LibTomCrypt’s cryptographic algorithms.
The implemented library is lightweight, modular, and most
importantly, secure. Secure, as defined in this context,
means the library is not vulnerable to timing attacks, back
doors, or weak key generation. Using enclaves as a safe
strongbox for keys, our implementation acts as an Applica-
tion Program Interface (API) for the implemented crypto-
graphic functions.
In the reminder of this chapter we will introduce the
threat model and describe the functions that we have im-
plemented and present their implementation details.
3.1. Threat Model
In our threat model, we assume a powerful adversary that
has complete access to the OS of the machine. This means
that the adversary can read all of an applications data but
she cannot read and write into Enclave page Cache (EPC)
pages i.e. where the enclave’s data is stored. However, we
are assuming that the adversary can only perform a remote
attack. This means that the adversary does not have physical
access to the machine. Moreover, in the case of physical
presence of the attacker, we reduced the attack surface to the
temporary buffers between an application and its enclave.
Following Intel SGX’s generic threat model, we do not
protect against passive address translation attacks where a
malicious kernel can obtain the page level trace of an ap-
plication executing inside the enclave and create a copy of
code and data present in the enclave’s address space. We
also exclude the CPU chip, power analysis, cache timing,
and side-channel attacks.
3.2. Utility functions
We implemented a generic I/O interface between the ap-
plication (untrusted code) and enclave (trusted code). In
the application part, we have standard C functions like
open(), read(), close(), and etc. that are used to
open a file and read chunks of it that are passed to the en-
clave using temporary buffers of size 4KB. We also imple-
mented a command line application that lets a user access
different cryptographic algorithms and define arbitrary key
lengths for performing the cryptographic operations on in-
put files.
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Figure 1. A sample SHA-256 scenario: The application is trying
to pass temporary buffers to the SHA-256 implementation inside
the enclave. The EID stands for Enclave ID.
3.3. Secure Key Generation
A pseudo random number generator is a key part of any
cryptographic library. Keys for HMACs, symmetric keys,
Initialization Vectors, and asymmetric keys all rely on ran-
dom bytes to be generated. A predictable pseudo random
number generator with low entropy is a point of attack for
an adversary. If an adversary can predict the bytes that are
used to generate a key, then the encryption can easily be
broken. Even in the asymmetric case, generating keys still
requires random numbers. If the attacker can predict the
randomness, then she can follow the rest of the key genera-
tion process to recompute the private key or reconstruct the
plaintext. For our project, we utilized the build in pseudo
random number generator that the SGX provides. While
LibTomCrypt has a few different algorithms for generating
random numbers, using SGXs implementation was simple.
We will leave the incorporation of LibTomCrypts pseudo
random number generators to give the user options on how
their key is generated to our future work.
As previously stated, one of the goals of this project
is to securely generate cryptographic keys inside the en-
clave. We meet this goal by writing a wrapper on top of the
sgx read rand() [15] function which lets the user to
generate her arbitrary-sized keys. The sgx read rand()
will only notify the status of operation to the user and the
keys will remain inside the enclave.
Figure 2. A sample SHA-256 scenario: The application is trying
to pass temporary buffers to the HMAC-SHA-256 implementation
inside the enclave. The EID stands for Enclave ID.
3.4. Hashes
We implemented the SHA-256 hash function. We chose
SHA-256 because it is the most well-known hash function
that does not have any known vulnerabilities. While a hash
function does not use any keys and could have been imple-
mented in user space, we needed to implement SHA-256
inside of the enclave in order to implement an HMAC. An
HMAC is a keyed hash that is used in many protocols in
order to ensure the integrity of data. Assuming the secrecy
of the key, HMACs prevent an adversary from modifying
data without the user becoming aware of the modification.
Thus, it is an important cryptographic primitive that must be
implemented inside of the enclave instead of in user space.
The followings are some implementation details about the
two hash functions:
1. SHA-256: Figure 1 illustrates our SGX-enabled SHA-
256. The user opens a file and then iteratively calls the
gen sha256() function to build the hash for the in-
put file. All the computations for generating the hash
digest out of temporary buffers are done inside the
enclave using gen sha256() implementation. The
user can access enclave functions using the Enclave
ID(EID). Finally, the user can retrieve the hash value
using get sha256().
2. HMAC-SHA256: Figure 2 shows how the SGX-
enabled HMAC-SHA-256 works. The HMAC-SHA-
256 follows a similar process to SHA-256. First, the
user requests the enclave to create a random key by
calling gen key() which is a wrapper on top of
sgx read rand() function. Then user opens a file
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and incrementally calls the gen hmac sha256()
function to build the hash for the input file. The
user can access this function by passing the Enclave
ID(EID) as a paramter to her function call. The gen-
erated key and digest are stored inside the enclave.
The user does not have explicit access to the hash
result, however, she can access the digest by calling
get hmac sha256() function.
Regardless of the size of input file, storing the incremen-
tal SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-256 hashes inside the en-
clave allows us to only store 256 bits digests, which verifies
our small TCB requirement.
3.5. AES
We implemented the symmetric key algorithm AES with
128, 192, and 256 bit key sizes. Similar to SHA-256, AES
is also the most well-known symmetric key algorithm and
is not vulnerable to any known attacks to this date. We first
implemented the block chaining mode with Electronic Code
Book mode (ECB). While not as secure, this was simpler to
implement than the other block chaining modes. Further-
more, we implemented Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) after
ECB. While ECB should not be used in many scenarios, we
implemented it as an option to the user and because it is a
building block for the rest of the block chaining modes in
LibTomCrypt library. While LibTomCrypt uses a software
based approach for AES, runtime performance gains can be
achieved by using the hardware implementation that comes
standard to Intel processors. Also, one can implement AES
using a library which supports for AES hardware imple-
mentation. Shifting this implementation over to hardware
approach will be left to future work.The followings are the
implementation details for two implemented AES modes:
1. AES-ECB: Figure 3 shows how an application com-
municates with AES-ECB implementation inside an
enclave. In the encryption phase, first the application
opens the file and requests a random key of desired
size (128, 192, or 256 bits). The enclave will gener-
ate the key but the key will remain in the enclave ad-
dress space. Then the application starts passing tempo-
rary buffers of plaintext to the encrypt aes ecb()
function and the function will return the generated
ciphertext using the keys stored in the enclave. In
the decryption phase, the application contacts the en-
clave which has the symmetric key and starts passing
stored ciphertext to the decrypt aes ecb() func-
tion. Having the key, the enclave will then produce the
plaintext and pass it to the application side. Through-
out a series of invocations, the application assembles
the original plaintext from received buffers and deliv-
ers it to the user.
2. AES-CBC: Figure 4 shows the overall process of AES
algorithm in CBC mode. This process is similar to
AES-ECB, except this process requires a 128 bit Ini-
tialization Vector (IV). This IV is also generated in-
side the enclave and stord there. The AES-CBC
has two phases: encryption (encrypt aes cbc())
where temporary buffers of plaintext are passed
to the enclave and the generated ciphertext are
stored in the application memory, and decryption
(encrypt aes cbc()) where temporary buffers of
ciphertext are passed to the enclave and the original
plaintext is generated incrementally inside the appli-
cation memory using the key and IV stored in the en-
clave.
Following our principle design decision, we keep the size
of our TCB as low as possible while implementing AES.
The plaintext and ciphertext are completely stored in the
application address space and the enclave just work on the
temporary chunks of data. Here, we only store vital infor-
mation that needs to be shielded from attacks including keys
and IVs.
3.6. Design Decisions
The implemented I/O interface in the application space
works with buffers of size 4KB. We pick 4KB buffers for
the following reasons:
• The OS supports for 4KB page sizes, thus having
larger buffers requires more pages.
• Since the AES block size is 16 bytes, we need buffers
of multiple of 2 to make them compatible with AES
blocks.
• The enclave heap size is a multiple of 4. Having
buffers of multiple of 4 provides us performance ad-
vantages in virtual memory.
In our implementation, we tested our prototype using
files at most 200MB. We hardcoded the value of buffer size,
still we believe our implementation is able to handle buffers
of size 1MB. Larger buffers avoid having numerous I/Os
and can scale our implementation, but at the same time, we
need larger enclaves with larger heap sizes to store these
temporary big buffers. In our current implementation the
enclave heap size is 100KB, but for handling 1MB buffers
we need to initialize enclaves with of size at least 2MB
which will increase the size of our TCB 20 times. Still, this
would not result to a practical barrier, because to the best of
our knowledge SGX-enabled CPUs can initialize enclaves
of size 90MB.
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Figure 3. A sample AES-ECB scenario: The left side represents the encryption process and the right side represents the decryption process.
The EID stands for Enclave ID.
Figure 4. A sample AES-CBC scenario: The left side represents the encryption process and the right side represents the decryption process.
The EID stands for Enclave ID.
3.7. Evaluation
While our current implementation only operates on a
per-session basis and keys are not stored in the enclave,
our library still operates securely under our threat model.
However, even if the keys were stored, our system would
still be secure. As we have previously stated, the crypto-
graphic keys are both generated and used for computation
inside of our enclaves. Since only the data, not the keys,
leave the enclave, an attacker is left with two options. The
first option is to break the encryption. Currently, reversing
a SHA-256 HMAC or discovering a key to an AES cipher
is computationally infeasible, assuming large enough keys
are used. Thus, until a vulnerability is found in one of these
algorithms, we can assume that a users data can be stored
safely outside of the enclave. The second option is to break
the SGX enclave and read the keys from its memory. In this
regard, we are relying on the security of the SGX. Any com-
promise found in an SGX processor would be a compromise
to our system. The only attacks that the SGX is known to be
weak against are attacks where the adversary has access to
the hardware of the machine e.g. CPU chip, power analysis,
cache timing, and side-channel attacks. Since we have as-
sumed a remote attacker in our threat model, an attack to the
hardware of the machine is out of the scope of our project.
Thus, under the assumed threat model we can conclude that
our system can securely store cryptographic keys such that
an attacker cannot read an applications encrypted data.
The proposed library ships with a rich command line and
it is available at (https://goo.gl/x7cduK).
./app -a
<sha256|hmac sha256|aes ecb|aes cbc>
[-userkey|-randomkey <key|keylen>]
-intext|-infile <input>
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4. Future Work
With limited time in the semester, there is much that
must be left to future work. The current uses of our crypto-
graphic library are very limited since we did not implement
saving the keys in the enclave. Since it has already been
proven that secrets can be saved and recovered inside of an
enclave, this was not our focus for the project. However, to
make this into a useful application, that would be the first
step. The followings are some interesting avenues for future
work of this project:
• Conducting a set of throughput experiments for having
a performance comparison between user space imple-
mentation of the selected cryptographic algorithms and
the SGX-enabled implementation in terms of the ex-
pected runtime. Furthermore, we can design an exper-
iment to demonstrate how buffer size impacts the over-
all performance of the cryptographic library. Laatly,
we can also compare the performance and features of
our library with a TPM chip and try to observe the per-
formance difference between these two prototypes.
• To increase the usability of this project, the library
should be expanded. Our work should be viewed as a
proof of concept. Adding different types of hash func-
tions and symmetric key algorithms would give users
more options on how they wanted to encrypt and verify
their data. However, it would be more helpful to add
other types of cryptographic algorithms such as public
key algorithms like RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
and Diffie Hellman key exchanges as well as various
pseudo random number generating algorithms. The
pseudo random number generator algorithms would al-
low a user to customize the way her keys are gener-
ated, instead of relying on SGXs implementation of a
pseudo random number generator.
• The LibTomCrypt [13] does not support hardware in-
structions for Advanced Encryption Standard New In-
structions (AES-NI) and the AES is implemented us-
ing software operations. We can look into other open
source cryptographic libraries like [16] and implement
the AES in hardware mode in order to improve the per-
formance of AES encryption and decryption.
• In our implementation, we expose an API to the user
which acts as a wrapper on top of some cryptographic
functions from the LibTomCrypt [13]. Another ap-
proach to provide access to our implemented library
inside the enclave would be to modify the LibTom-
Crypt functions in a way make them compatible to
work with user’s temporary buffers. Thus, we can
grant finer level of access to the users and remove the
wrapper layer from our implementation which trivially
results a performance gain.
• Creating a key exchange between two enclaves would
make this a much more useful application. Currently,
the library can only be used to encrypt and decrypt an
applications own data. However, by creating a proto-
col to allow two separate enclaves to safely exchange
keys over an unsafe network, the library can become
a persons primary means of storing and utilizing cryp-
tographic keys. The protocol to share secrets between
two enclaves could be incorporated into existing proto-
cols that hinge on the use of cryptographic keys. In this
way, the keys used in these protocols can be secured
inside an enclave and protected from software based
threats. Furthermore, using SGXs properties of remote
attestation, the enclaves can verify that both users are
storing their keys inside of an enclave. This will ensure
that both parties will not leak the shared secret key.
5. Conclusion
As a CPU manufacturer, hardware is not the only inno-
vation incentive that drives Intel. This time, the Cupertino-
based company is trying to revolutionize the software in-
dustry by keeping the software developer’s critical code
and data in a hardware protected memory region. In this
project, we leveraged the linux-sgx-sdk to produce a
secure cryptographic library that acts as a wrapper atop of
an existing cryptographic library LibTomCrypt and sup-
ports SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-256, AEC-ECB, and AES-
CBC cryptographic operations. In this way, we have added
a protection layer to the typical cryptographic operations by
using hardware protected enclaves to preserve user privacy
and prevent malicious applications from accessing the gen-
erated keys. The keys generated using this cryptographic li-
brary will never leave the enclave and the user who requests
a key through this library will never have direct access to
the key. In essence, we implement a secure cryptographic
API as a service protected through hardware to be safe from
any untrusted software or hardware.
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6. Related Work
There are three articles from three different Intel’s re-
search groups dated back to 2013 that introduce the Intel
SGX extension for the first time in a workshop on hardware
and architectural support for security and privacy (HASP).
The first paper is written by Frank McKeen.et al. [1] in-
troduced the concept of an enclave within an application’s
virtual address space and showed how these hardware en-
forceable containers enable application to execute with con-
fidentiality and integrity. They gave a flavor of instruction
set and software model of SGX along with its data struc-
tures and components. Comparing with a technical report
like an Intel manual, they fairly described SGX instructions
to load, create, enter, and exit an enclave and enclave pag-
ing.
The second paper from the initial series of SGX publica-
tions [2] discusses the usage of SGX in protecting enterprise
rights and data as a technological solution that is helping de-
velopers to ensure that even naive users can safely manage
their personal, financial, and organizational properties with-
out limiting their user experience. Also, they introduced the
fundamental SGX terminology. The most significant terms
include enclave, measurement, and attestation. An enclave
is an isolated region of memory. measurement describes the
cryptographic hash of the code and data within an enclave.
Lastly, attestation is the mechanism to verify an enclave’s
identity. Finally, they illustrated how the SGX fits in the
software life cycle of an enterprise using One-time Pass-
word (OTP), Enterprise Right Management (ERM), and Se-
cure Video Conferencing (SVC).
From their illustrations, we talk a little more about OTP.
OTP is an authentication technology often used as a sec-
ond factor to authenticate users. It is a one-time password
solution to authorize online financial transactions. Imple-
menting an OTP within an enclave is somehow similar to
our idea of implementing a crypto system inside an enclave.
Here the OTP prototype prevents malicious software from
gaining access to the OTP pre-shared keys which is exactly
our goal in this project.
The third paper from the primary research track of SGX
[3] described the components that allow secure remote pro-
vision of enclaves over the network. They proposed a new
software lifecycle for shipping software without sensitive
data. This process consists of launching an enclave, re-
mote attestation for requesting sensitive data from the ser-
vice provider, data provisioning from the service provider
using a secure channel, data sealing/unsealing to securely
encrypt and store data in the enclave, and finally software
upgrade for migrating data between different versions of the
software.
The mechanisms that they have proposed to allow secure
attestation and sealing provides a mean for the enclave to
prove its identity to a remote service provider. In our con-
text, we require to ship keys across the network via secure
remote cryptographic operations. So, we can follow the im-
plemented attestation and sealing policies of SGX in order
to create a tamper resistant key encryption/decryption over
the network.
The second wave of SGX’s publications from Intel Cor-
poration belongs to SGX2 which was publicly introduced in
2016. In this research paper, F. McKeen et al. [17] extends
the SGX instruction set to support dynamic memory man-
agement for enclaves which removes some limitations of
SGX1. The SGX2 addresses three shortcomings of SGX1.
First, in SGX1, all enclave memory must be allocated at the
enclave’s build time, which slows the build time. Also, in
SGX1 enclave’s memory size cannot expand or shrink while
an application is running on an enclave. Second, in SGX1
the access permissions associated with an enclave page are
stored in the Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM) which can-
not be changed after a page is added to an enclave. This
means that a developer should set highest required permis-
sions during an enclave’s build time to allow all possible op-
erations on the enclave. Third, SGX1 does not completely
provide library OS support for secure exception handling
and lazy loading code inside an enclave. To rectify these
shortcomings, in SGX2 the memory management function
is split between the OS memory manager (external man-
ager) and the internal enclave resource manager (internal
manager).
In summary, the SGX2 instructions enable better protec-
tion for code and data inside an enclave. Also, these in-
structions added support for dynamic memory management
(Enclave malloc and free), multithreading, and chang-
ing the EPCM’s permissions in runtime that empowers an
enclave to escalate and deescalate the page permissions for
garbage collection. Also, the SGX2’s library OSes provide
a new type of container where an application is bundled
with an OS runtime that executes in the user level. Finally,
these library OSes provide secure exception handling for
enclaves. The new Intel’s SGX2 Instruction Set Architec-
ture (ISA) brings a handful of exciting new hallmarks for
system software developers. Unfortunately, after a quick
surf inside the Intel’s developer zone, we found out that the
current hardware does not support SGX2 instructions, how-
ever, SGX1 instructions should suffice for porting a crypto-
graphic library into an enclave because it provides the basic
required functionality to protect the keys from being leaked.
Ignoring the emergence of the SGX version 2, Ja-
cob I. Torrey et al. [18] from Intel Corporation write
about the design decisions that a system developer may
consider to protect data on a compromised environment.
They reintroduce Hardened Anti-Reverse-Engineering Sys-
tem (HARES), which is a thin hypervisor utilizing the Ex-
tended Page Table (EPT). EPT can set certain memory
pages to execute-only mode and prevent the data pages from
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being executed by malicious software. The HARES hyper-
visor uses on-CPU Advanced Encryption Standard - New
Instructions (AES-NI) to encrypt/decrypt memory pages. In
the presence of a permission violation, the hardware will
trigger a VM exit to the HARES to update the EPT permis-
sions with proper permissions. Comparing to the traditional
approaches of protecting application via isolation, HARES
shares a great deal of similarities with SGX, like setting
page permissions and utilizing CPU registers for storing en-
cryption keys during software runtime.
They present three case studies to show how SGX af-
fords system protection against both software and hardware
attacks. The first example is the BlacPOS/Kaptoxa which
is a malware that caused the Point of Sale (POS) breach of
Target Corporation. In order to place a financial transaction,
the POS devices sends the Personally Identifiable Informa-
tion (PII) such as a card number or personal identification
number to a server for authorization. They claimed that In-
tel SGX could have secured the PII memory by creating en-
claves which denied access of malware to the PII memory
region.
The second case study is the Bolware/Eupuds which is
malware that performed the Man In The Middle (MITM)
attack on Boleto payments in Brazil. There is a security
plugin that Boleto’s customer should download and install
on their browser. The Eupuds malware had the ability to
detect this plugin and by performing some JMP instructions
bypassed this security layer. The authors claimed that, if
they could have utilized enclaves to perform different levels
of sanity checks for data packets in the browser and prohibit
the malware from modifying the data flow.
In the third case study, they present examples of cross-
process injection which obfuscates malicious code within
a trusted code. The Flame which blends itself with
iexplorer.exe closely mimicking the system behavior
and BetaBot which injects its malicious code into Avast anti
virus are two prime examples of this type of attack. The au-
thors state that if the applications targeted by cross-process
injection attack were placed in protected enclaves, this kind
of attack would have been prevented. SGX has higher level
of privileges than windows kernel functions, and SGX will
not allow malicious code to spawn a new process inside an
enclave.
Enclaves typically make use of features provided by the
memory management unit (MMU) in addition to encryption
to make themselves opaque to malicious intrusion. In our
proposal, we try to protect the cryptographic operations in-
side an enclave. This is similar to following the recommen-
dations that the authors gave the corporations such as Mi-
crosoft or Target to secure their products from adversaries.
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [19] introduced the
concept of software attestation using an auxiliary on-board
chip for commodity computers. Despite its wide deploy-
ment, this approach is not used in many security systems
due to the ever-increasing pace of software updates and the
impossible maintenance overhead. Compare to SGX which
is embedded in the CPU chip, TPM is an standalone chip
which communicates with the CPU via the communication
bus. Therefore, TMP is vulnerable to attackers who can
tap the communication bus between the CPU and the TPM.
Technically, TPM is not vulnerable to software attacks, yet
it is vulnerable to an attacker who has physical access to the
machine. Finally, it is impossible to remove a software who
is measured by TPM from the measurement stored in the
TPM Platform Configuration Register (PCR) because TPM
tries to measure and verify the software after each reboot.
TPM is an international standard for a secure crypto-
graphic processor whereas SGX is a set of Intel’s propri-
etary CPU instructions. These two technologies have simi-
lar capabilities such as remote attestation, data binding and
sealing. In this project, we are going to use SGX instruc-
tions to implement a cryptographic library, yet one can ac-
complish this mission using TPM specification.
Intel’s Trusted Execution Environment (TXT) [20] uses
TPM’s software attestation but reduces the software running
within the secure container to a Virtual Machine Monitor
(VMM). TXT secures the software inside the container by
ensuring that the container has exclusive control over the
entire machine while it is active. Even though TXT provides
basic building blocks of an immune system but it is not
designed to provide runtime protection against software at-
tacks like buffer overflow attacks. On the other hand, com-
bining TXT with Intel Virtual Machine Extension (VMX)
allows system developers to create secure operating sys-
tems.
Compared to TPM and its transcendant Intel TXT, Intel
SGX cannot replace the traditional secure boot technolo-
gies. SGX primarily tackles the software development life-
cycle instead of BIOS and boot security. The Intel TXT
triggered the first move for reducing the software inside the
container which recently rises as SGX’s enclaves for stor-
ing sensitive code and data. Although we will not study
the possibility of implementing a protected cryptographic
library in the context of TXT, but applying this idea to TXT
seems feasible and promising.
Intel SGX Explained was written by V. Costan and S. De-
vadas [21], two research scientists from MIT, and it presents
an in depth study of SGX. Instead of directly jumping to in-
specting the SGX architecture, the authors start the paper
with information about computer architecture and security
which is a prerequisite for analyzing the SGX. They com-
prehensively investigate SGX hardware design, implemen-
tation details, and programing model based on Intel SGX
patents, tutorials, and developer’s manuals. Finally, they
use this information to analyze SGX security properties and
conclude that SGX is not resistant to software side-channel
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attacks.
While the hardware behind SGX lacks publicly available
documentation, they point out a few avenues for SGX anal-
ysis. Based on their observations, SGX is vulnerable to de-
bugging ports and DRAM address line bus tapping attacks
because the code and data inside the enclave are stored in
plaintext in the on-chip cache. As a result, the enclave
contents travel on the uncore’s ring bus without any cryp-
tographic protection.
Modern Intel processors come with hyper-threading fea-
ture that shares the execution unit and caches on a core
by two enabled Logical Processors (LPs). Since the SGX
does not prevent hyper-threading, a malicious system soft-
ware can execute a snooping thread on a core shared with
a victim enclave. Then, this snooping thread can learn
the enclave’s executed instructions and memory access pat-
terns. This problem can be solved simply by disabling the
hyper-threading feature or fundamentally by fixing hyper-
threading vulnerability.
Unfortunately, SGX does not protect against passive ad-
dress translation attacks. Since the memory accesses issued
by a SGX enclave goes through the Intel architecture’s ad-
dress translation process, a malicious kernel can obtain the
page level trace of an application executing inside an en-
clave and create a copy of code and data present in the en-
clave’s address space.
The SGX threat model excludes CPU chip, power analy-
sis, cache timing, and side-channel attacks because of their
high cost, complexity and deep needed expertise. However,
these kinds of attacks can be mounted by unprivileged soft-
ware and SGX can be circumvented dealing with them.
On the other hand, SGX offers some security mech-
anisms. The SGX uses the Enclave Page Cache Map
(EPCM) to store each Enclave Page Cache (EPC) page’s
position in its virtual memory address space. In order to
let EPC be over-subscribed, SGX allows system software to
evict EPC pages into untrusted DRAM. The contents of the
evicted page and associated EPCM metadata are encrypted
to protect confidentiality, integrity, and freshness. This ap-
proach protects enclaves against active attacks using page
swapping.
Also, the SGX design prevents malicious software to
read and write the EPC pages i.e where the enclave data is
stored because the SGX is implemented in processor’s mi-
crocode which has higher privilege than the malicious soft-
ware and also SGX’s microcode always regulates switching
between enclave and non-enclave codes.
Partner with Intel Corporation, Microsoft Research uti-
lizes SGX for its Haven prototype [22]. Haven’s goal is to
shield applications from an untrusted cloud. Andrew Bau-
mann et al. leverage the hardware protection of Intel SGX
to defend the unmodified legacy applications such as an
SQL server and Apache. These legacy applications are run-
ning on a malicious OS, but are protected against privileged
code and physical attacks. Haven brings confidentiality and
integrity to the code and data running on a compromised
OS. Haven runs the entire legacy application in an enclave,
which is a bad practice due to creating a specific amount
of underutilized memory at enclaves build time and limit-
ing the entire application (trusted or untrusted parts) passing
through the SGX instructions.
The Haven paper [22] points out three primary deficien-
cies of SGX. First, they discovered that some of the SGX
internal states are exposed to the OS exception handler.
Second, SGX does not support dynamic memory allocation
where enclave pages cannot be added after creation. Third,
Enclave page permissions cannot be changed after creation.
As we reported in [17], these three shortcomings were re-
cently addressed in SGX version [17].
In its threat model, Haven attempts to protect against
Iago attacks - a class of attacks which arises under the pres-
ence of a malicious OS - by limiting the scope of core
OS primitives within an enclave and narrowing the ex-
posed SGX interface to attacks. Haven addresses these re-
quirements by emulating unsupported SGX instructions and
adding a set of primitive operations to two Windows 8 APIs,
the Library OS and Shield module. The Library OS imple-
ments the Windows 8 API using a small set of primitives
such as threads, virtual memory, and file I/O. The Shield
module is one part of the TCB which provides the ABI re-
quired by Library OS to access a set of core OS operations.
The TCB set of Haven is larger than what we are going to
trust in our project, since we only trust the enclave itself.
Verifiable Confidential Cloud Computing (VC3) [23]
from Microsoft research is the first system that relies on
Intel SGX to secure Hadoop MapReduce Cloud workloads
and ensures correctness and completeness. They claimed
that the VC3 treat model accounts for adversaries who con-
trol the entire cloud infrastructure but at the same page, they
move the Denial of Service (DoS), hardware side-channels
and fault injection attacks out of the picture.
An interesting design principle of VC3 [23] is to work
on an unmodified version of Hadoop. Also, they reduce the
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) from Hadoop and operat-
ing system to binding the Hadoop jobs to a small amount of
code that implement the VC3 cryptographic protocol. VC3
uploads this code to a secure SGX enclave in each Hadoop’s
worker node, make it accessible to operating system and
runs its key exchange protocol inside it to encrypt/decrypt
map and reduce tasks.
The VC3 is implemented using a SGX emulator that
contains handler for all primary SGX instructions. In our
case, since we do not have access to an Intel CPU shipped
with SGX, we may follow their approach to implement our
project. Also, VC3 uses enclaves memory to provide a re-
liable key exchange mechanism for launching map and re-
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duce jobs. Similar to them, one of our assumptions in our
project is to keep the generated keys inside a SGX enclave.
Before official release of SGX emulator from Intel Open
Source (01 dot org), the researchers from the Georgia In-
stitute of Technology were busy writing the OpenSGX, an
SGX emulator. Launching the official SGX open source
kernel module by Intel killed the potential opportunities for
OpenSGX, unless these researchers proposed a new practi-
cal usage for their SGX implementation. In the OpenSGX
paper, Seongmin Kim et al. [24] investigate the design
choices of applications and protocols operating on com-
modity Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). They ex-
plore the possibility of using Intel SGX for a wide range of
network applications such as software-dened inter-domain
routing, peer-to-peer anonymity networks, and middle-
boxes. Also, they measure the potential overhead of the
SGX-enabled design by implementing these network appli-
cations in the context of OpenSGX.
In the OpenSGX paper, Seongmin Kim et al. inves-
tigate the design choices of applications and protocols
operating on commodity Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE). They explore the possibility of using Intel SGX
for a wide range of network applications such as software-
dened inter-domain routing, peer-to-peer anonymity net-
works, and middle-boxes. Also, they measure the poten-
tial overhead of the SGX-enabled design by implementing
these network applications in the context of OpenSGX.
Prerit Jain et al. [25] from Georgia Institute of Tech-
nology argues the fact that TEE seriously lags behind its
hardware counterparts and a certain group of researchers
has only access to the latest hardware breakthroughs such
as Intel SGX. Thus, they reintroduce the OpenSGX, which
emulates Intel SGX instructions as an open platform for
SGX research.They use QEMU’s userspace binary transla-
tion to implement SGX instruction. The OpenSGX is not
an exclusive instruction emulator, yet can be seen as a tiny
OS which is able to load enclaves into programs. More-
over, OpenSGX has a user space API, debugging tool, and
performance monitoring tool.
The last OpenSGX’s paper [26] from Georgia Institute of
Technology tries to secure the Network Function Virtualiza-
tion (NFV) applications by providing a secure framework.
They use OpenSGX to protect specific NFV states which
need protection and move these states inside enclaves. In
their threat model, they assume NFV applications are de-
ployed in an untrusted data center. Finally, as a proof of
concept they use Snort a lightweight Network Intrusion De-
tection System (NIDS). They demonstrate their work by se-
curing the tag state of Snort which helps the packet process-
ing with both OpenSGX emulator and SGX-equipped ma-
chines. Leveraging the remote attestation feature of SGX,
the S-NFV further supports secure bootstrap for measuring
whether an application is booted correctly and established a
secure communication channel i.e. it binds a key pair to the
remote attestation protocol.
After launching the official release of Liunx-SGX emu-
lator from Intel Open Source, and shipping the Intel’s Sky-
lake processor in 2015 and its successor Kaby Lake pro-
cessor in 2016 which are equipped with SGX extension, it
seems Georgia Tech researches are not of the inclination
of using OpenSGX anymore and as of right now they are
mostly demonstrating their scenarios and ideas using both
OpenSGX and SGX-enabled hardware.
IPMe proposed by Anitha Gollamudi et al. [27] is a
novel calculus that shows the necessity of SGX-like en-
clave mechanism. In this security-typed calculus, they
show how SGX enforces confidentiality policies against ar-
bitrary attacks on non-enclave code that can corrupt enclave
code. IPMe captures an imperative higher-order calculus
that captures the key features of enclaves and supports the
specification of information security policies. Since we are
focusing on a practical problem and this paper is focused
on mathematics, we only needed to understand the broader
ideas in this paper.
In [28], the authors propose DARKLY, a privacy protec-
tion system for adding a protection layer between an un-
trusted software (e.g. a perceptual sensor) running on top of
an trusted hardware (e.g. OpenCV as a trusted vision API)
to preserve user privacy and prevent malicious applications
from accessing the hardware. Their proposed privacy pro-
tection solution is based on the statement that most legit-
imate applications do not need unrestricted access to raw
physical resources. They evaluated their proposed layer of
security using 20 existing OpenCV applications and they
observed no significant degradation in functionality and ac-
curacy of these applications.
One of the interesting byproducts of DARKLY is that al-
most all of the tested OpenCV applications can connect to
DARKLY without any modifications. In words, DARKLY’s
Application Programming Interface (API) lets unmodified
OpenCV applications to run throughout this trusted API in
a secure manner. Thus, people can easily secure they appli-
cations using DARKLY API.
DARKLY tries to provide privacy protection for percep-
tual applications and this scheme can be observed in our
work as well. We are trying to secure cryptographic opera-
tions by placing them into an enclave which is functionally
similar to the way DARKLY lets OpenCV applications se-
curely communicate with perceptual hardware like camera,
headphone, or etc.
In an attempt to patch the weak isolation in software con-
tainers shipping within a multi-tenant environment, Sergei
Arnautov et al. introduce SCONE (Secure Container Envi-
ronment) [29] which implements a cryptographic handle to
encrypt/decrypt data for eliminating the SGX system calls
overhead. It also supports user-level threading and asyn-
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chronous system calls. The design decisions of SCONE
leads to a small TCB which follows the idea of keeping
the container size small and low performance overhead.This
avoids the transition overhead of enclave’s execution state
and the high cost of non EPC page faults.
Their threat model considers a powerful adversary which
has superuser privileges and hardware access. The at-
tacker has access to the system software and OS kernel and
can modify network packets. They ignore DoD and side-
channel, timing and page fault attacks because exploiting
them is expensive for both attacker and system maintainer.
In order to keep the TCB as small as possible, they ob-
served that most of network services communicates are via
network sockets or stdin/stdout streams, so they im-
plement a library to transparently shield the outgoing sys-
tem calls by encrypting/decrypting their communications
per file descriptor. Also, they use Transport Layer Security
(TLS) to protect the network communication of enclaves.
They reduce the SGX overhead by implementing the
user-level threading inside an enclave that maps OS threads
to logical application threads of an enclave and schedules
OS threads between enclave threads while having blocking
system calls, thus avoiding the need for enclave threads to
exit the enclave.
An inexperienced user can benefit from SCONE as long
as she trusts the container creator. Also, for running a
SCONE container, the user need a SGX-enabled CPU, SGX
kernel module, and an optional kernel module for asyn-
chronous system call support. It is a good idea to under-
stand the design decisions of SCONE and apply them to
our problem, since we are also trying to keep our TCP as
small as possible.
Raoul Strackx et al. [30] propose a set of additive secu-
rity primitives for protected-module architectures like Intel
SGX to avoid exploiting vulnerabilities while these systems
crash, reboot, or lose power. Their additional security mea-
sures ensure that 1) a protected state can never be rolled
back to a previous stale state, 2) accepting an input, the
module must eventually finish processing the input or never
start processing it, and 3) an unexpected power loss should
never cause the system not to start after the reboot. Fol-
lowing these primitives, they propose a mathematical solu-
tion to the state continuity problem which lies behind these
primitives and implement Ariadne, a library providing state
continuous storage (libariadne). They tackle an im-
portant quirk of SGX technology where SGX enclaves are
destroyed when the system is suspended or hibernated. In
their threat model, the enclaves are running on top of an un-
trusted operating system in which its entire software stack
is compromised and the attacker can halt the enclave’s exe-
cution at any moment in time. They claim that adding their
implementation to the existing SGX instruction set will fix
the state-continuity problem of SGX.
Nico Weichbrodt et al. [31] show that neutral synchro-
nization bugs in enclave code can turn into severe security
flaws that help an attacker to hijack enclave’s control flow
or bypass access control. In their threat model, they as-
sume that an attacker has full access to the OS and can start
and stop enclaves. They propose the AsynchShock tool,
a semi-automated tool for thread manipulation that exploits
the use-after-free and time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCT-
TOU) synchronization bugs inside an enclave. They show
how these bugs can be combined with interrupts which are
coming from a malicious OS and create a threat.
Studying the nature of atomicity-violation bugs, they im-
plemented the AsynchShock which is a shared library that
utilizes the scheduling pattern of an SGX enclave to trig-
ger an exploit which consists of a series of thread creation,
segmentation faults and timer expiration. An example of
exploiting the use-after-free bug is that they use objdump
to find where the free function is located in the code page,
using AsynchShock’s registered signal handler, they manip-
ulate the enclave’s page access permissions to trigger a seg-
mentation fault for the free function and then initiate a
hijack process to exploit the bug.
Florian Tramer et al. [32] define a formal model, the
transparent enclave execution that ensures integrity and au-
thenticity but not confidentiality. They formalize the Sealed
Glass Proof (SGP) that attests the correct execution of snip-
pet while it is running transparently. They present a set of
theorem and their associated proofs to ground SGP and as
their case study, they use SGP to show the presence of the
SQL injection bug in a sample web login page.
In their threat model, they also tackle the data leakage
problem while having side channels. We believe the obvi-
ous drawback of their approach is the transparent execution
of enclave which makes enclave’s data and secret visible to
other processes.
The LibTomCrypt Developer Manual [13] describes the
motivation behind the project and everything a developer
needs to know in order to use or build upon the existing li-
brary. LibTomCrypt is open sourced and built to be highly
modular, two necessities for our project. While the library
does not support SSL or verification of certificates, it con-
tains all the necessary tools to do so. The API was built to
be able to support any new cipher, hash, or pseudo random
number generator. Thus, as new algorithms are created and
old algorithms are broken, very few lines of code will have
to be changed to create new, up to date enclaves.
The manual describes how to use the API for symmet-
ric block ciphers, hash functions, message authentication
codes, pseudo random number generators, RSA and Ellip-
tic Curve public key cryptography, and digital signatures.
It provides sample code for each category of algorithms
and an explanation on how to implement them in a pro-
gram. Furthermore, the documentation includes advice on
13
key sizes, thread safety, pseudo random number generators,
and buffer overflows. This manual simplifies our process of
wrapping the library in an enclave. The sample code pro-
vided will be a good starting point for our project.
The Elliptic Curve Cryptology in Practice [33] was pub-
lished as a result of the joint work of researchers from Mi-
crosoft, the University of Michigan, and the University of
Pennsylvania. The paper reviews how elliptic curve cryp-
tology is used in real systems such as Bitcoin, SSL, TLS,
and Austrian Citizen ID cards.
As a result, the researchers found three vulnerabilities
to avoid when utilizing elliptic curve cryptology. The first
was to use a NIST standardized curve. Many servers were
found that used smaller, and thus easier to crack, elliptic
curves. The standardized curves are built to avoid known
backdoors into breaking the encryption. Second, an elliptic
curve can be broken if weak keys are used. Weak keys were
defined to be keys that were generated with a poor pseudo
random number generator and using the same keys across
distinct instances of virtual machines. Third, using a poor
pseudo random number generator or reusing the same nonce
for digital signatures can leak the private key.
[34] was published for the use of federal employees to
ensure their cryptographic mechanisms uphold the system
requirements for confidentiality, integrity, and authentica-
tion. While the audience of the paper was federal employ-
ees, in general developers should follow these guidelines to
help create secure applications. Mechanisms, not policies,
are discussed in this document. For our project, the im-
portant take away from this document is the recommended
algorithms and key sizes for symmetric cryptographic al-
gorithms, asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, hash func-
tions, and pseudo random number generators. We only want
to include in our enclaves the algorithms that have been rig-
orously tested and do not have any known vulnerabilities.
Since most of the algorithms supported by LibTomCrypt
are recommended by this document, the process of imple-
menting only the strongest algorithms from LibTomCrypt
into our enclaves will be simple.
[35] begins by describing formal definitions for proto-
cols, sessions, and key exchanges. Next, the paper defines
two classes of attack models: the Unauthenticated-Links
Adversarial and the Authenticated-Links Adversarial. The
Unauthenticated version is much more dangerous. That at-
tacker has the power to listen, delay, prevent, change, or
create any messages between two parties. In the Authen-
ticated version, the only difference is that the attacker can
only transmit existing messages. He or she can no longer
create any message.
Session key security is defined to be that an attacker does
not gain any information about a session key by interacting
with the key exchange protocol or by attacking other ses-
sions or other users. A protocol is deemed to be secure if
an attacker cannot guess more than half of the bits of the
session key. The paper then evaluates a few protocols, such
as signed and unsigned Diffie-Hellman, based upon the pre-
viously defined attack models and the definition of session
key security.
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